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Religious Exemptions, Formal Neutrality,
and La'cit6

FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS*

ABSTRACT

Rights tofree exercise in the United States are governed by a doctrine offormal
neutrality,which seems to resemble the French doctrine of la'cit6. This resemblance
tempts one to conclude that the doctrinal regimes of religious liberty in the United
States and Franceare also essentially the same. Despite their supelficialresemblance,
howeve); formal neutrality and laYcit6 generate regimes of religious liberty that are
substantially,even radically, different. Notwithstanding conceptually similar organizing principles, there is a significantdifference in the substance of religiousliberty in
the United States and Franceowing to very different conceptions of the proper role of
the state in securing religiousfreedom and other human rights. This difference is evident in the grammarthat each country uses to describefree exercise rights, in their respective responses to the problem of religious and moral difference, and in their
differingconceptions of equality adopted.
INTRODUCTION

The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution provides that neither the national government nor the states may
enact a law "prohibiting the free exercise of religion."' The precise meaning of
this phrase has been highly contested, especially during the last half century. For
much of that time, the Free Exercise Clause was interpreted by the Supreme
Court to require that religious individuals and organizations be excused or "exempted" from complying with any law that interfered with their religious be*Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah;
email: gedicksf@lawgate.byu.edu. I am grateful to Lee Andelin for research assistance.
1. The full text reads, "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibition the free exercise thereof." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first clause is known as the "Establishment Clause," and the second as the "Free Exercise Clause." Applicable only against the
national government when they were initially ratified in 1791, both clauses were held applicable
to the states in the 1940s. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947); Cantwell v. Connecticut,

310 U.S. 296 (1940).
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liefs or practices, unless the government could identify an especially important
regulatory interest that would be left unprotected by an exemption. 2 In practice,
the Court denied exemptions more often than it granted them, though the doctrine was more effective in lower courts and in administrative settings. Moreover, whatever its actual effectiveness in protecting religious freedom, the
exemption doctrine stood for nearly three decades as a powerful symbol of the
subordination of the state to religious belief and exercise.
The Supreme Court abandoned the exemption doctrine in 1990 in Employment Division v. Smith, holding that the Free Exercise Clause does not require
that believers be excused from complying with a law that burdens their beliefs or
practices, so long as the law is "religiously neutral" and "generally applicable." 3
Religious neutrality and general applicability are terms of art that serve as important qualifiers to the general rule.4 Smith was hugely controversial when it
was handed down,5 and it remains the target of much criticism.6 Although several of the justices have criticized Smith,7 the majority of the Court has given no
indication that it is prepared to reconsider the decision, and after sixteen years, it
appears to be here to stay.
Smith is usually understood to have imposed "formal neutrality" as a controlling principle on free exercise doctrine. Formal neutrality in the domain of
religious freedom is a government stance that simply ignores the religious character of beliefs and practices for all government purposes. Philip Kurland described this posture as preventing government from using religion as a
"standard for action or inaction," thus disabling government from using religion

2. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Frazee v. I11.Dep't of Employment Sec. (Unemployment Compensation Cases), 489 U.S. 829 (1989); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n,
480 U.S. 136 (1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398
(1963).
3. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4. See infra Part II.
5. See, e.g., James D. Gordon, III, Free Exercise on the Mountaintop, 79 CAL. L. REV. 91 (1991);
Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SuP. CT. REV. 1; Michael W. McConnell,
Religious Freedom at a Crossroads,59 U. Cm. L. REV. 115 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin de Si&le Sketches, 75
IND. L.J. 295 (2000).
7. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 544-45 (1997) (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., dissenting); Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 564 (1993) (Souter,
J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
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or religious classifications "either to confer a benefit or to impose a burden."' For
example, a formally neutral ban on the sale and possession of alcohol, as once existed in the United States and still persists in some pockets of the rural South,9
would ban the use of wine to celebrate the mass. Providing an exemption for religious uses of wine would violate formal neutrality by expressly recognizing a
class of believers and excusing them, as believers, from complying with the ban.
Under a formally neutral regime, the fact that a ban on alcohol interferes with a
religious rite is irrelevant, because the religious or nonreligious character of the
use of alcohol is irrelevant. Formal neutrality treats everyone the same, believer
and nonbeliever alike (though this is not, of course, necessarily the same as treating everyone equally or justly).
The meaning of the French doctrine of la!'cit6 is something of a puzzle for
Americans. Difficult to render in English, its meaning seems to resonate with a
cluster of English terms, such as "secularism," the "separation of church and
state," and, of course, "neutrality," including formal neutrality. The Academie
FranCaise,for example, defines la'icit6 as "the character of religious neutrality, independent with regard to all churches and confessions."'" Other authorities echo
the sense of laYcit as state neutrality toward religion and religious belief,
achieved and maintained by a rigorously secular administration of the government, the political system, and public life generally.
8. Philip B. Kurland, Of Church and State and the Supreme Court, 29 U. CHi. L. REV. 1, 96
(1961). Professor Laycock, who was a faculty colleague of Professor Kurland, cautions that Professor Kurland himself may not have understood his standard to be synonymous with formal neutrality, though it is so understood today. Douglas Laycock, Formal,Substantive,and Disaggregated
Neutrality Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 999 (1990).
9. Compare U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII (prohibiting the "manufacture, sale, or transportation"
of alcoholic beverages within the United States and its territories) with U.S. CONST. amend. XXI
(repealing Amendment XVIII, but allowing states the option of prohibiting importation of alcoholic beverages).
10. DICTIONNAIRE DE L'ACADEMIE FRANGAISE 7 (9th ed. 1992), availableat http://www.academiefrancaise.fr/dictionnaire/, translatedin Holly Hinkley Lesan, The Muslim Foulard in France's Public Square: Current Conceptions of L'Ordre Publique, Laicit6, and Religious Liberty (May 8, 2004)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
11. See, e.g., Jean Bauberot, The Placeof Religion in PublicLife: The Lay Approach, in FACILITATING FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF: A DEsKBooK 441, 441 (Tore Lindholm et al. eds., 2004)
(Lai'citE"signifies the absence of any official religion in a country, but also the absence of any official state atheism."); T. Jeremy Gunn, Religious Freedom and La'cit6: A Comparison of the United
States and France, 2004 BYU L. REV. 419, 420 n.2 (defining lallciti as a "political notion involving
the separation of civil society and religious society, the State exercising no religious power and the
churches.., exercising no political power") (quoting 5 LE GRAND ROBERT DE LA LANGUE FRANCAISE
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The resonance between formal neutrality and la'fcit6 tempts one to conclude
that they are essentially the same.' 2 From this, it might follow that the doctrinal
regimes of religious liberty in the United States and France are also essentially
the same. Despite their superficial resemblance, however, formal neutrality and
la'fcit6 generate regimes of religious liberty that are substantially, even radically,
different. I will suggest in this article that, notwithstanding conceptually similar
organizing principles, there is a significant difference in the substance of religious liberty in the United States and in France owing to very different conceptions of the proper role of the state in securing religious freedom and other
human rights. The conception of the good that informs American government
is more procedural and less substantive than that which informs the French
state. In Rawlsian terms, one could say that the United States has a much "thinner" theory of the good than does France. 3 Whereas "religious freedom" in the
United States typically suggests freedom of religion from state interference, in
France la'fcit6 often connotes the state's "protecting citizens from the excesses of
religion,"' 4 and this makes all the difference.
A full-fledged defense of this thesis is beyond the scope of this article. What
I hope to do is simply to illustrate it by providing three points of conceptual contact between French and American free exercise principles. The first point is
grammatical, though nevertheless revealing-the syntax used by each country
to inscribe protection of religious freedom in its basic laws. 5 The remaining two
points are more substantive-the differing ways in which the doctrine of religious freedom in both countries has responded to the problem of religious and
moral difference in their respective societies, 16 and the more formally egalitarian

915 (Alain Rey ed., 2d ed. 1992)); Lesan, supra note 10, at 12 ("La'cit6 describes the Isecularl character of the state rather than a right or freedom of its citizens."); Michel Troper, Religion and
ConstitutionalRights: FrenchSecularism, or La'cit6, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1267, 1267 (2000) ("French
secularism-or laicit6--is usually defined as a system in which there is a separation between religion and the state. That is to say, political and administrative powers are exercised by nonreligious
authorities.").
12. See, e.g., Troper,supra note 11, at 1267 (observing that the "United States is sometimes considered in France a laic state.., because in the United States the state is independent of any particular religion," but also noting that "[sleparation is not ... an appropriate translation of laicit6").
13. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE §§ 60-62, at 395-407 (1971).
14. Gunn,supra note 11, at 420 n. 2 .
15. See infra Part I.
16. See infra Part II.
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quality of American free exercise doctrine in comparison to the French
'
doctrine. 7
I should also emphasize that my purpose is descriptive, rather than normative. Although I think I prefer the approach of the United States, that is perhaps
more a matter of habit than of analysis. There is much to recommend in both
8
systems, which I will address in my conclusion.'
I.

FREE EXERCISE GRAMMAR IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE

Religious freedom guarantees in Europe follow a particular syntax. They
usually state a general definition of the freedom of religion, and then describe
activities that fall outside the definition of religious freedom, and circumstances
under which government may properly limit that liberty. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention), for example, prescribes the right to "freedom of thought,
conscience, and religion," and defines this right as encompassing the right to
manifest one's beliefs or religion alone or with others, in public or private,
through "worship, teaching, practice, and observance."' 9 The European Convention also provides, however, that this seemingly broad right may be limited
to protect "public order, health, or morals," or to protect the "rights and freedoms of others. '2' The French guarantee of religious freedom in the Law of
1905 follows this pattern, first broadly protecting the "liberty of conscience" and
the "free exercise of religion," then narrowing this protection by subordinating
it to the state's interest in maintaining public order, and further specifying that
2
the state does not remunerate or subsidize religious activity. '
The religious exemption doctrine in the United States was consistent with
this syntax. As I have indicated, from 1963 until it abandoned the exemption doctrine in Smith in 1990, the United States Supreme Court construed the Free Exercise Clause as providing that a law that interfered with a religious belief or practice

17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 9, Nov. 4
1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222,230.
20. Id.
21. Loi du 9 D&embre 1905 [Law of Dec. 9, 1905] arts. 1,2,availableatwww.legifrance.gouv.fr/
texteconsolide/MCEBW.htm; see also Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen art. 10,
Aug. 26, 1789, availableat http'//www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/rightsof.htm.
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violated the free exercise of religion, unless the government could show that the
law protected a particularly important regulatory interest in the least restrictive or
intrusive manner. The justification required of the government under the exemption doctrine, however, was more restrictive than the limitations clauses that characterize the French Law of 1905 and the European Convention.
The Smith doctrine of formal neutrality, on the other hand, is not easily
stated in this grammar. Freedom of religion after Smith is less a liberty right than
an equality right-a formal equality right. To say that the Free Exercise Clause
protects only against government action that intentionally burdens religious liberty, as Smith does, means that in terms of "limitations," the law in the United
States is that religious activity generally may be limited for any reason other than
antireligious animus. Although this appears to leave freedom of religion fully
exposed to government insensitivity or indifference to incidental burdens that
its actions may impose on religion, I shall explain how the equality-shaped contours of constitutional doctrine in the United States buffer religious beliefs and
practices from such burdens by enabling believers in many circumstances to
claim the same protection as that afforded by government to the beliefs and
22
practices of those committed to secular ideologies and moralities.II.

SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION IN

THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE

A. American Spirituality
One of the most important developments in recent decades in the United
States has been the growth of an individualized, extradenominational interest in
religion that is usually referred to as "spirituality." In a monograph provocatively entitled Spiritual,but not Religious, Robert Fuller defines spirituality as the
attitude of one struggling to understand how his or her life relates to a greater
cosmic scheme. 23 According to Fuller, "[w]e encounter spiritual issues every time
we wonder where the universe comes from, why we are here, or what happens
when we die," as well as when we are "moved by values such as beauty, love, or
creativity that seem to reveal a meaning or power beyond our visible world. 24
"An idea or practice is 'spiritual,"' argues Fuller, "when it reveals our personal

22. See infra Part III.

23.

ROBERT

C. FULLER,

24. Id. at 8-9.

SPIRITUAL, BUT NOT RELIGIOUS

8 (2001).
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desire to establish a felt-relationship with the deepest meanings or powers gov25
erning life.1
"Spirituality" captures the religious stance of the increasing number of
Americans who practice religion outside of the teachings and doctrines of a traditional denomination. 26 Many such believers see the catechisms and other theological boundaries of denominational religion as obstacles to their personal
quests for meaning in life.27 As Fuller suggests, they describe themselves as
"spiritual," but not "religious. '28 Fuller estimates that as many as one in five
Americans currently fit this description,29 with the number steadily increasing.
If accurate, this estimate would mean that there are nearly as many spiritually
unchurched people in the United States as there are members of any single denomination. 0
The influence of the new spirituality is not confined to the unchurched, but
has reached into denominational religion to alter the relationship of members to
their churches. Those who retain a denominational affiliation are increasingly
shifting their religious commitment away from strict adherence to the beliefs and
practices of their denomination, in the direction of personal spirituality. 3' Religion
has become, in a word, "consumerized. 32 Many religious Americans now "shop"

25. Id. at 9.
26. See, e.g., Peter L. Berger, Reflections on the Sociology of Religion Today, 62 Soc. RELIGION 443,
446-47 (2001) (noting the "declining number of people who profess traditional religious beliefs,"
and who define and practice "their religiosity in non-traditional, individualized and institutionally loose ways"); Charles Trueheart, Welcome to the Next Church, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Aug.
1996, at 37 (describing contemporary American churches that have wholly abandoned the traditional Christian denominational forms of worship).
27. FuLLER, supra note 23, at 4.
28. FULLER, supra note 23, at 4; accord Berger, supra note 26, at 448.
29. FULLER, supra note 23, at 5.
30. ALAN WOLFE, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN RELIGION: How WE ACTUALLY LIVE
OUR FAITH 183 (2003).
31. See FULLER, supra note 23, at 9.
32. See Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Religious Experience in the Age ofDigitalReproduction, 79 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 127, 157 (2005) (noting the "consumerization of religion and religious experience" enabled by digitization and postmodernism); CHARLES TAYLOR, VARIETIES OF
RELIGION TODAY 102-03 (2002) (noting that in the United States, the consumerization of religion
resonates with the general consumer culture that developed in the wake of the dramatic growth of
economic well-being in the latter half of the twentieth century); Martin Marty, The Widening
Gyres of Religion and Law, 45 DEPAUL L. REV. 651, 664 (1996) (noting the "postmodern approach
in organized religion, where the chaos of the marketplace and the 'picking and choosing' of religions have prevailed").
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for a church to attend like they do for consumer goods, choosing one because of
the individual needs and preferences that it satisfies, rather than the truth of the
doctrines it teaches.33 A related and growing phenomenon is so-called "cafeteria"
or "grocery-cart" religion, in which one picks and chooses which of the doctrines
and practices of a denomination one will observe, assembling a bricolage of beliefs
and practices from among the teachings and doctrines of diverse and antagonistic
denominations and traditions.34 Charles Taylor has succinctly captured this bewildering growth of "intermediate positions" between atheism and orthodox belief
in the United States and other Western nations:
IMlany people drop out of active practice while still declaring
themselves as belonging to some confession or believing in God.
On another dimension,. . . a wider range of people express religious beliefs that move outside Christian orthodoxy. Following in
this line is the growth of non-Christian religions, particularly
those originating in the Orient, and the proliferation of New Age
modes of practice, of views that bridge the humanist/spiritual
boundary, of practices that link spirituality and therapy. On top of
this, more and more people adopt what would earlier have been
seen as untenable positions; for example, they consider themselves
Catholic while not accepting many crucial dogmas, or they combine Christianity with Buddhism, or they pray while not being
certain they believe."
The traditional denominational church "held and dispensed the 'means of
grace' through which the individual might attain salvation, and without which
that salvation was in jeopardy."36 One of the principal tasks of the traditional denomination was to police the conformity of parishioners to the behavioral and
creedal requirements of membership, and to certify the good standing before
God of those members who comply with these requirements.37 In the contemporary church, however, "the individual is the focus and exerciser of power"; indi33. Rebecca French, Shoppingfor Religion: The Change in Eveiyday Religious Practiceand Its
Importance to the Latv, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 127, 164-65 (2003). See generally Trueheart,supra note 26.
34. French, supra note 33, at 165-66; Berger, supra note 26, at 448.
35. TAYLOR,supra note 32, at 106-07.
36. BARBARA HARGROVE, THE SOCIOLOGY OF RELIGION 128 (1979).
37. See id. at 128.
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viduals judge their religion on the basis of whether it helps them to understand
and discover themselves in the midst of the demands of their everyday life,
rather than whether its teachings and doctrines conform to an external and ulti38
mate divine reality.
B. DoctrinalImperativesof Spirituality
Religious nondiscrimination is the only plausible understanding of what the
Free Exercise Clause can require in a religiously plural postmodern United
States marked by growing interest in spirituality and declining interest in traditional denominational religion. Denominational religion made the religious exemption doctrine plausible. Only when the definition of religion is strictly
confined within clear boundaries can the state safely excuse citizens and others
from obeying the law on the basis of religious beliefs or practices. Without a relatively narrow definition of religion, the effect of the exemption doctrine is to
excuse unacceptably large numbers of people from complying with unacceptably large numbers of laws. As the Supreme Court observed in Smith, allowing
religious belief to excuse the violation of law "would be to make the professed
doctrines of religious belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself." 9 The broader the definition of
religion, the larger the potential number of people that might be excused from
obeying the law.
The unworkability of the exemption doctrine, and the inevitability of its replacement by formal neutrality and religious nondiscrimination, were evident
almost as soon as the Court adopted the exemption doctrine in the 1960s. The
first of the Draft Exemption Cases involved a university student who sought exemption from the draft, not on the basis of the teachings of a denominational re38. Id. Again, Taylor suggests that the self-oriented character of spirituality is the result of a
long series of developments in Western history. TAYLoRsupra note 32, at 8-13.
39. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98
U.S. 145,166-67 (1879)); see alo Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, The Vulnerability
of Conscience: The ConstitutionalBasisfor Protecting Religious Conduct, 61 U. CHi. L. REv. 1245,
1256 (1994) (arguing that "idiosyncracies [sic] in the welfare functions of some individuals will
support extreme and intuitively discreditable demands on social resources on their behalf," yet
"[rleligious belief need not be founded in reason, guided by reason, or governed in any way by the
reasonable. Accordingly, the demands that religions place on the faithful, and the demands that
the faithful can in turn place on society in the name of unimpaired flourishing, are potentially
extravagant.").
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ligion or any conventionally religious beliefs of his own that war is morally
wrong but rather on the basis of a personal morality that he derived from personal study of mostly secular philosophy.4"
In the world of the American framers, to be morally and conscientiously opposed to war was to be religiously opposed to war, almost by definition, since in
the United States of the late-eighteenth century agnostic or areligious systems of
morality were barely conceivable. By the 1960s, however, it could hardly be
doubted that one could be a moral and conscientious pacifist without believing
in God or adhering to any religious tradition whatever. As the Supreme Court
recognized, it would have been deeply unjust in this social context to limit conscientious draft exemptions to members of denominational religions that teach
the immorality of war. Accordingly, the Court expanded the statutory definition
of religious belief beyond its conventional meaning to encompass a person's "'ultimate concern,"' or that which a person takes "'seriously, without any reservation.".'4' While this expanded definition avoided injustice, it threatened the
efficient operation of the military draft, by greatly expanding the pool of potential conscientious objectors to include those whose opposition to war, though
42
morally founded, was entirely secular.
A similar dynamic affected the Court's decisions in two cases involving the
Amish in the 197 0s and 1980s.43 The Amish are a small anabaptist sect that seeks
to live according to the simplicity of preindustrial times, eschewing the use of most
modern machines, appliances, and communications, and retaining an oldfashioned style of dress and social interaction. In the first of these cases, the Amish
sought to have their children excused from attending public high school as required by compulsory school-attendance laws, claiming that such attendance had

40. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166-67 (1965).

41. Id. at 187 (quoting

PAUL TILicH, THE SHAKING OF THE FOUNDATIONS

57 (1948)); accord

Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 339-40 (1970) ("What is necessary under Seeger for a registrant's conscientious objection to all war to be 'religious' within the meaning of § 6(j) is that this
opposition to war stem from the registrant's moral, ethical, or religious beliefs about what is right
and wrong and that these beliefs be held with the strength of traditional religious convictions.");
see also Marty, supra note 32, at 666 (observing that the "tradition that saw religion dealing always
with a Supreme Being" is "thinned out" in Seeger and Welsh).
42. See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455 (1971) ("Apart from the Government's need
for manpower, perhaps the central interest involved in the administration of conscription laws is
the interest in maintaining a fair system for determining who serves when not all serve.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
43. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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a corrosive effect on the Amish religious community. 44 Though it was sympathetic
to this claim, the Court nevertheless feared that many other groups-especially
counter-cultural "hippy" communes-might also seek to be excused from schoolattendance laws. 45 As the Court stated, "ITihe very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in
which society as a whole has important interests. 46 Though the Court did indeed
grant the Amish an exemption, it wrote its opinion so narrowly that it was diffi47
cult to see how anyone but the Amish could qualify for it.
A decade later, the Amish sought exemption not from the burden of compulsory school-attendance laws but from that of paying social security selfemployment taxes. Here the Supreme Court recognized the potential avalanche
of exemption claims from others that would follow a decision granting the
49
4
Amish exemption from paying taxes, ' and denied exemption to the Amish.
The Draft Cases and the Amish Cases capture the dilemma of an exemption
regime in a world of broad religious and moral difference, in which secular
commitments have the same moral status as religious commitments, and in
which it is common for individuals to manufacture their own idiosyncratic religions without the discipline of denominational boundaries: To avoid inequality
and unfairness, exemptions must be extended beyond the traditional denominations to those with unusual religious beliefs, as well as to those whose beliefs are
based upon secular morality. Yet, to extend the reach of exemptions so far would
seriously undermine the observance, and thus the effectiveness, of law.

44. E.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218.
45. See, e.g.,id. at215-16.

46. Id.

47. See id. at 235-36 (emphasizing that the Court was "not dealing with a way of life and mode
of education by a group claiming to have recently discovered some 'progressive' or more enlightened process for rearing children for modern life," and observing that "a history of three centuries
as an identifiable religious sect and a long history as a successful and self-sufficient segment of
American society" had enabled the Amish to make a "convincing showing" that "few other religious groups or sects could make" of the "sincerity of their religious beliefs," the "hazards presented by the State's enforcement" of the disputed statute, and the adequacy of the informal
vocational training associated with Amish life as a substitute for compulsory high school education); ROBERT G. MCCLOsKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 238 (4th ed. 2005) (observing that
the Court was "careful to limit its decision [in Yoder] to groups like the Amish, with their centuries-long history and general record of good behavior").

48. See Lee, 455 U.S. at 259-60 ("[I]t would be difficult to accommodate the comprehensive social security system with myriad exceptions flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs.").

49. Seeid. at 261.
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C. French Parallels
The problems of religious difference and idiosyncratic spirituality have
their parallels in France. Professor Baub6rot, for example, has observed the
widespread sympathy for Buddhism in France, especially among the young, and
notes that many such sympathizers integrate "elements of Buddhism into a personal religious identity which fuses different traditions."5" He also refers to the
emergence of "a new type of religious individualism" in France, according to
which "each person invents.., a personal spiritual itinerary with sole reference
to herself."5' All this, of course, is to say nothing of Islam, now the second largest
52
religion in France, approaching 10 percent of the population.
The French reaction to pluralism and immigration has been quite different
from that of the United States. Rather than retreating to formal neutrality or
some other doctrinal principle that avoids the need to distinguish among religions, the reaction of France has been precisely to develop such distinctions.
Thus, in the French jurisprudence of religious freedom there is an express distinction between the religion and the sect, with the implication that the sect is
threatening to public order and thus properly subject to special government controls and regulations. Similarly, though Islam is obviously not a sect, at the heart
of the headscarf controversy is the disquieting sense that, with Islam, "something foreign and non-French has infiltrated" French society, 53 refusing to assimilate and adopt secular, French republican values, like la'cit6 5' As many have
observed, this fear of immigrant subversion of French values to religious values
was a persistent theme of the Stasi Commission. 55 In France, diversity is not the
unalloyed good that it often seems to be in the United States, and this is clearly
reflected in France's rejection of the formal neutrality that the United States has
embraced as a governing principle of free exercise doctrine.

50. See Baub6rot, supra note 11, at 450.

51. Id. at 453;see also Jacques Robert, Religious Liberty and French Secularism, 2003 BYU L. REv.
637, 652 (2003) (describing as one of the "major currents underllyingl public opinion" in France
"the evolution of science and faith," leading "to a sort of 'deregularization' of all beliefs and to
transfers and migrations heavy with amalgamations and derivatives" of religion).
52. See Baubrot, supra note 11, at 450; Robert, supra note 51, at 655-56.
53. Gunn, supra note 11, at 456-57.
54. See Lesan, supra note 10, at 43 (noting "France's discomfort with its 5 million person [Islamic] minority and this population's hesitation to wholeheartedly adopt a French heritage").
55. See, e.g., id. at 23-24.
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III.-FREE EXERCISE DOCTRINE IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE

A. The American Doctrinesof Religious Neutrality and GeneralApplicability
The central element of the formal neutrality adopted by the Supreme Court
in the Smith doctrine is a general rule of deference to government action that incidentally burdens religious beliefs or practices. Religiously neutral and generally applicable laws that incidentally burden religious exercise are subject to
minimal judicial scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause. Only when a law
lacks religious neutrality or general applicability is it subject to "strict" or height56
ened judicial scrutiny.
A law lacks religious neutrality if its text or purpose discriminates against
religion-that is, if it restricts religious practices because they are religious. 5 7 As I
have explained, a law is formally neutral with respect to religion if it does not use
religion as a basis of classification-that is, if the religious beliefs and practices of
those to whom a law applies are irrelevant to the law's goals. Religious discrimination may be evident from the text of the law,58 as well as from its effect. 9
Religious neutrality presupposes that the purpose of the Free Exercise
Clause is to prevent religious discrimination, rather than to protect freedom of
action in a domain of religious liberty. General applicability is an additional prohibition on religious discrimination which prohibits laws that pursue secular ob-

56. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32, 546 (1993);
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,877-80, 882,884-85 (1990).
57. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533.
58. Id. ("[Tihe minimum requirement of neutrality is that a law not discriminate on its face. A
law lacks facial neutrality if it refers to a religious practice without a secular meaning discernable
from the language or context.").
59. Id. at 534-35 ("Official action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot
be shielded by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality .... Apart from the text,
the effect of a law in its real operation is strong evidence of its object."). For example, the Court
noted that use of words like "sacrifice" and "ritual" in the ordinances, id. at 534, as well as the recital in these laws that they were intended to prohibit religions engaging in particular practices
contrary to "public morals, peace or safety," id. at 535, were evidence that the texts of the ordinances were not religiously neutral. The Court also counted as evidence of lack of religious neutrality that virtually the only conduct the ordinances prohibited was the worship rituals of the
Santeria. Id. at 535-36. For example, although the ordinances purported to regulate the unnecessary and inhumane killing of animals, hunting and fishing for sport, using rabbits to train greyhound racing dogs, and kosher slaughter by severance of the carotid arteries were all exempt from
the prohibitions of the ordinances. Id. at 535-37.
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jectives only against religious conduct.6" A generally applicable law is one that
does not focus its burdens or benefits on a particular religious class to the exclusion of secular classes that are similarly situated.6'
Religious neutrality and general applicability are mutually reinforcing tests:
A law that religiously discriminates is usually not generally applicable, and a law
that focuses its burdens entirely on religious persons and organizations is usually
not religiously neutral.6 2 Consider, for example, a police force grooming standard
which purports to prohibit officers from wearing beards, in order to promote a
clean-cut image and to develop esprit de corps among officers.63 Assume that the
police force refuses to exempt from this standard Muslim, Sikh, and other officers
who wear beards for religious reasons, but that it routinely exempts any officer
who wears a beard because he suffers from a skin condition; because, say, he
wishes to keep his face warmer during the winter; because he is portraying Santa
Claus in a local Christmas play; because he wishes to look older and more distinguished; or, indeed, because of any reason other than religious conscience.' Even
if the standard is somehow worded so that it does not by its terms classify on the
basis of religion, its effect is still to prevent police officers from wearing beards only
when they are worn for religious reasons. The standard thus lacks religious neutrality, because it singles out or targets religious conduct for a burden-the prohibition on wearing beards for religious reasons-that is not imposed on secular
65
conduct-beards may be worn for any nonreligious reason.
60. See, e.g., Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 524 ("ITihe principle of general applicability was violated because the secular ends asserted in defense of the [challenged] laws were pursued only with respect
to conduct motivated by religious beliefs."); id. at 543 ("[G]overnment, in pursuit of legitimate interests, cannot in a selective manner impose burdens only on conduct motivated by religious
belief .. "); id. at 545 ("[E]ach of Hialeah's ordinances pursues the city's governmental interests
only against conduct motivated by religious belief. The ordinances 'ha[vel every appearance of a
prohibition that society is prepared to impose upon [Santeria worshipers] but not upon itself"')
(quoting and paraphrasing Florida Star v. B.J.E, 491 U.S. 524, 542 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment)).
61. See Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 543.
62. Id. at 531; see aLo Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 165 F.3d 692, 701-02 (9th
Cir. 1999), vacatedon ripenessgrounds on rehearingen banc, 220 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir. 2000) ("Underinclusiveness is not in and of itself a talisman of constitutional infirmity; rather, it is significant
only insofar as it indicates something more sinister," such as a government goal of "suppressing religious exercise.").
63. See Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 366
(3d Cir. 1999).
64. See id. at 360.
65. See id. at 365.
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The grooming standard also lacks general applicability. If one assumes that
most police officers do not wear beards for religious reasons, then a grooming
standard that prohibits beards only when they are worn for religious reasons
does not apply to most of the police force."6 In American constitutional jurisprudence, a law lacking general applicability is called "underinclusive," because "it
applies to less than the entire universe of cases that pose the problem the law
seeks to solve."6 7 The grooming standard is dramatically underinclusive, because it prohibits only a small portion of the conduct-wearing a beard-that
purportedly undermines its image and officer-unity purposes.
Although the Supreme Court characterizes both religious neutrality and
general applicability as tests that screen for religious discrimination, a broader
reading of general applicability is possible. Consider a police grooming standard
that prohibited all officer beards, except those worn for medical reasons." Such
a policy might be justified on the dual grounds that those who suffer severe skin
irritations from shaving can only comply with the standard by sacrificing their
health, and that those officers availing themselves of the exception are likely to
be a relatively small percentage of the force.
Of course, those who wear beards as a matter of religious belief can make
comparable claims: Those who adhere to religions that require their male members to wear beards can only comply with the standard by abandoning this precept of their religion, and the number of officers wearing beards for religious
reasons is likely to be a relatively small percentage of the force. From this, one
can argue that the standard lacks general applicability because it is underinclusive with respect to its stated purposes-that is, it exempts some beards from the
standard, thereby undermining its image and moral purposes, but refuses to exempt other beards that do not undermine these purposes to any greater extent
than the exempted beards.
This broader reading of general applicability screens for a kind of religious
discrimination that the narrow reading does not, what is sometimes referred to as
"hostile indifference" to religion on the part of the government.69 A standard that
prohibits all beards except those worn for medical reasons does not target only re66. Cf id. at 367 (noting that the Muslim plaintiffs differed from most other members of the
force in wishing to wear beards for religious reasons).
67.
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68. Shaving reportedly causes severe acne and skin irritations in some men, particularly African
Americans.
69. See Perry, supra note 6, at 300-02.
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ligious conduct, because substantial amounts of secular conduct-beards worn
for warmth, costume, or personal preference-are prohibited along with religious conduct-beards worn for religious reasons. It thus does not violate the
principle of religious neutrality. The standard nevertheless discriminates against
religion, though in a more subtle way. Exempting secular activity from a law, but
not religious activity, reflects a legislative determination that nonexempt religious
activity is less important than the exempted secular activity. 70 Put another way, the
medical exemption reflects an implicit judgment that freedom of religious exercise is a less important personal interest than maintaining a clear complexion. Yet,
religious activity is a "constitutionally preferred" liberty under the express protection of the Free Exercise Clause, whereas most secular activity reflects interests of
no special constitutional significance. 7 By exempting from the standard beards
worn for medical reasons, but not beards worn for religious reasons, the grooming
standard elevates the right to proper treatment of a medical condition, which is
nowhere guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution, over the right to the free exercise of
one's religion, which is expressly protected by the First Amendment.
Some commentators have argued that this broader reading of general applicability requires strict scrutiny of any law that provides for any secular exemptions, but no religious exemptions. 72 This is not a reading that has been adopted
by the Supreme Court, however. Although there are hints that the Court might
be prepared to expand the meaning of general applicability in a proper case, 73 re70. Eugene Volokh, A Common Law Modelfor Religious Exemptions, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1465,
1541 (1999). Because he maintains that judgments about the extent to which religious activities are
comparable to exempted secular activities are better made by legislatures than courts, Professor
Volokh argues that laws which favor secular activities over apparently similar religious activities,
by exempting the former but not the latter, are "perfectly proper." Id. at 1540-41.
71. Laycock, supra note 5, at 51; see also Note, Neutral Rules of General Applicability: Incidental
Burdenson Religion, Speech, and Property, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1713 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme
Court now provides greater constitutional protection to private property rights than to free exercise rights).
72. See, e.g., Richard F. Duncan, Free Exercise is Dead, Long Live Free Exercise: Smith, Lukumi
and the GeneralApplicability Requirement, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 850 (2001).
73. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 542 (1993) ("All
laws are selective to some extent, but categories of selection are of paramount concern when a law
has the incidental effect of burdening religious practice."); id. at 543 ("The ordinances are underinclusive for those ends [of protecting public health and preventing animal cruelty]. They fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than Santeria
sacrifice does. The underinclusion is substantial, not inconsequential."); Employment Div. v. Smith,
494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990) (distinguishing Unemployment Compensation Cases because, interalia, they
did not involve "an across-the-board criminal prohibition on a particular form of conduct").
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quiring that the government provide religious exemptions whenever a law allows any exemption for secular conduct would be to create an exception to the
74
Smith doctrine that swallows up the general rule.
A more realistic reading of general applicability would require the government to show that exempted secular conduct has a different relationship to the purpose of the law than nonexempted religious conduct. 75 In other words, a religious
exemption is required only when nonexempt religious conduct presents no greater
threat to a law's purpose than already exempt secular conduct. 76 To return yet again
to the police officer grooming standard, suppose that the standard prohibits all officer beards for image and unity purposes, except those worn by undercover officers. Granting an exemption to the latter does not undermine these purposes,
because undercover officers by definition have concealed their association with the
77
police force and thus do not project any image at all on behalf of the police force.
Similarly, because undercover officers do not interact with regular officers as part
of the regular uniformed chain of command, their beards do not disrupt force unity
to the same extent as beards worn by regular uniformed officers.
74. See MCCONNELL ET. AL., supra note 67, at 212 (suggesting that there is no difference between
an exception to a law, and a simple lack of coverage by the law); Carol M. Kaplan, Note, The Devil
Is in the Details: Neutrality, GeneralApplicable Laws and Exceptionsfrom Smith, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1045, 1067 (2000) (arguing that a constitutional rule that mandated a religious exemption whenever a law allows any sort of secular exemption "clearly flies in the face of the holding in Smith");
Kenneth D. Sansom, Sharing the Burden: Exploring the Space Between Uniform and Specific Applicability in CurrentFree ExerciseJurisprudence,77 TEx. L. REV. 753, 768 (1999) ("[Olne can posit that
a law which includes even a single secular departure, but does not match it with an equivalent accommodation departure is not generally applicable for the purposes of the Free Exercise Clause
because it is underinclusive in that there is some secular conduct to which it does not apply.
Lukumi does not, however, support such a simple decision.").
75. Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause: Three Abnormalities, 75 IND.
L.J. 77, 119 (2000) [hereinafter Gedicks, The Normalized Free Exercise Clause];see also Robert W.
Tuttle, How Firm a Foundation?ProtectingReligious Land Uses After Boerne, 68 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 861, 888-90 (2000) (arguing for a similar conclusion based upon the heightened "hard-look"
rational basis scrutiny of City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,473 U.S. 432 (1985), in which
the Court invalidated denial of a special use permit for a group home for the mentally retarded by
rejecting purported distinctions between the home and other permitted uses).
76. Gedicks, The Normalized FreeExercise Clause,supra note 75, at 118-19; accord Sansom,supra
note 74, at 770 (arguing that a religious exemption from a law is appropriate under the General
Applicability Exception when a secular exemption permitted by the law would "undermine the
purpose of the law's general proscription or mandate," and allowing a religious exemption "would
not undermine that purpose any more than the secular departure already does").
77. Fraternal Order of Police Newark Lodge No. 12 v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 360, 366 (3d
Cir. 1999).
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In sum, according to the Supreme Court a religiously neutral law does not
fail the test of general applicability merely by being modestly or even substantially underinclusive; rather, the law must be so dramatically underinclusive that
religious conduct is virtually the only conduct to which the law applies. The
Court apparently will tolerate a substantial amount of underinclusion before
finding that a law is not generally applicable, so long as the underinclusion stops
short of actually targeting religious conduct. Whether the doctrinal hurdle represented by general applicability will be raised so far as to require heightened
scrutiny of laws that exempt secular conduct but not similarly situated religious
conduct, as suggested by some lower court decisions, 78 remains to be seen.
B. DoctrinalDimensions of LaYcit?
As before, one can cite the French distinction between religions and sects as
evidence of a lesser commitment to religious neutrality as a constitutional norm
78. See, e.g., Tenafly Eruv Assoc., Inc. v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F3d 144 (3d Cir 2002) (upholding injunction against enforcement of ordinance prohibiting signs on city-owned utility
poles, as against Orthodox Jews who had used the poles to mark an eruv, on grounds that city had
not enforced the ordinance to prevent display of some name and address signs and certain symbols
on the poles); FraternalOrderof Police, 170 F.3d at 367 (holding that police department's refusal to
exempt Muslim police officers from no-beard rule when rule provided for medical exemptions is
subject to strict scrutiny, because "[w]e are at a loss to understand why religious exemptions
threaten important city interests but medical exemptions do not"); Black Hawk v. Pennsylvania,
114 F. Supp. 2d 327, 331-32 (M.D. Pa. 2000) (holding that statute giving government authority to
grant exemptions from provision requiring destruction of aggressive wild animals is subject to
strict scrutiny); Keeler v. City Council, 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md.1996) (holding that application of
historic preservation ordinance against church is subject to strict scrutiny when ordinance provided for exemptions in case of a "major improvement of benefit to the city," "financial hardship,"
or circumstances that would not be in the "interests of the city" or of"a majority of persons in the
community," but did not provide for religious exemptions); Rader v. Johnston, 924 F. Supp. 1540,
1553 (D. Neb. 1996) (holding that refusal to exempt evangelical Christian from parietal rule requiring that freshman live in university housing is subject to strict scrutiny where "exceptions are
granted... for a variety of nonreligious reasons, [but] not granted for religious reasons," "[olver
one third of the freshman students ... are not required to comply with the parietal rule," and
there existed a system of individualized assessment which "refused to extend exceptions to
freshman ... for religious reasons"); Horen v. Commonwealth, 479 S.E.2d 553, 557 (Va. Ct. App.
1997) (holding that government intent to discriminate against religion may be inferred from state
law prohibiting possession of owl feathers, which exempted "taxidermists, academics, researchers,
museums, and educational institutions," but not those who possess owl feathers for bona fide religious uses). But see Jackson v. District of Columbia, 89 F. Supp. 2d 48 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (declining to
apply general applicability analysis to underinclusive classifications burdening free exercise rights
of incarcerated prisoners).

RELIcIOUS

EXEMPTIONS, FORMAL NEUTRALITY, AND LA ciTJK491

governing the free exercise of religion. As I have mentioned, France has a welldeveloped jurisprudence surrounding the distinction between religions and
sects. Such a distinction would be illegitimate in American constitutional jurisprudence, though it undeniably plays an informal role in shaping issues and decisions before some judicial and administrative decisionmakers.
The situation with general applicability is more complex. Although the policy
relating to "ostentatious" religious clothing and symbols in French public schools
was triggered by the headscarf controversy and unquestionably aimed at Islam, by
its terms it has a broader application. For example, the policy prohibits large
Christian crosses and Jewish yarmulkes as well as headscarves, and it applies to ostentatious political symbols as well as religious ones. The unwillingness to formulate a policy solely for Islam-which could not credibly be treated as a sect even
under the French religion-sect distinction-or even solely for religious clothing
and symbols, suggests the possibility that general applicability is a jurisprudential
principle that could take root in the French doctrine of religious freedom.
More broadly, France has a powerful sensitivity to religions and sects that
seem to threaten or undermine its concept of the republican citizen and the republican society. One senses that most of France is united in the commitment to

protect republican values against such threats, even if such protection requires
imposing special legal burdens on particular religions and sects that refuse to assimilate to the majority's understanding of French republicanism. Again, such a
response to nontraditional religions is not part of formal doctrine in the United
States. While one certainly hears in certain sectors of politics and the popular
media the accusation that particular beliefs are "un-American," the idea that
such "un-Americanism" might be legitimately and openly used as a predicate
for legislation or regulation of religious exercise remains beyond the limits of legitimacy in American constitutional law.
CONCLUSION

Both of our countries can learn from each other. In the United States, the
conception of liberty as the absence of government makes it convenient to forget
that the withdrawal of government power will leave liberty in its wake only if
there are no imbalances of private power. Where such imbalances exist, it may
be the obligation of government to intervene, even at the cost of intrusion upon
individual privacy and choice. This is the grim lesson of domestic violence,
which was sheltered for generations in the United States by a commitment to
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"familial privacy." It may also be the lesson of the current church abuse cases, in
which it has become evident that sexually predatory clergy in the United States
were sheltered in their crimes by an excessive constitutional commitment to
church autonomy. Formal neutrality mitigates the consequences of such a withdrawal, by authorizing government to regulate religious people when they pose
the same secular threat as everyone else.
In France, where it is common to think of individual liberties as being
achieved through the state, rather than in opposition to it, the risks of constitutional privacy and regulatory withdrawal are more obvious. Again, one can see
this in the report of the Stasi Commission, which was concerned that if headscarves were not banned in public schools, many Islamic school girls would be
forced against their will by parents and co-religionists to wear headscarves and
otherwise to observe the strictly constrained female roles set out by fundamentalist and certain conservative strains of Islam. The headscarf was thus interpreted
by the Commission as a symbol of the repression of women by fundamentalist
Islam and other culturally conservative faiths, and banning the headscarf in public
schools was understood as a vehicle of liberty, freeing girls from their religious and
cultural bonds to assume the liberated life of a citizen of the Republic.
But there is a cost here, too. Women, even well-educated women who have financial resources and who are fully informed of their rights and options, do not
always freely choose the life of the model republican citizen, or any other life that
might be promoted by the state. Liberty includes the right to choose for oneself
what to make of oneself. For women and others who find meaning, identity, and
purpose in culturally conservative religions, the insistence of the state that they assimilate to the secular, republican values of la'icit6 forces them to make the cruel
choice between religious fidelity and national loyalty. Those who cannot or will
not abandon the bonds of faith withdraw from public life and discourse into
greater cultural isolation, resentful, angry, and isolated, and are thus at greater
risk of becoming true enemies of the Republic. Indeed, the estrangement of so
many Muslims from the public life of France is commonly cited as a principal
cause of the 2005 Muslim riots in the Paris suburbs. When weighed against the
vivid costs of cultural isolation, formal neutrality, for all of its own risks and costs,
may have something to offer constitutional jurisprudence in France.

